KIEP possesses highly knowledgeable economic research staff. Our staff includes many research fellows with PhDs in economics from international graduate programs, supported by dozens of professional researchers. Our efforts are augmented by our affiliates, the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) in Washington, D.C. and the KIEP Beijing office, which provide crucial and timely information on local economies. KIEP has been designated by the government as its Center for International Development Cooperation and the National APEC Study Center. KIEP also maintains a wide network of prominent local and international economists and business people who contribute their expertise on individual projects.
KIEP continually strives to increase its coverage and grasp of world economic events, and expanding cooperative relations has been an important part of these efforts. In addition to many joint projects in progress KIEP is aiming to become a part of a broad but close network of the world's leading research institutes. Considering the rapidly changing economic landscape of Asia, which is leading to further integration of the world's economies, we are confident that KIEP's win-win proposal for greater cooperation and sharing of resources and facilities will increasingly become standard practice in the field of economic research. Tables   Table 1 . Baseline Correlation ························································································· 12 Table 2 . Benchmark Measurement of a Shift toward Service Economy -the US case : ratio of employees in service to manufacturing sector as a proxy for firm share ratio ······································································································· 20 Table 3 Note: (a) the index is the GDP weighted average of total fixed investment in current local currency, normalized to 1 for the year 2007. The GDP used is based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total. "Advanced" economies include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. "Emerging" economies are Argentina, Brazil, China, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
I. Introduction
(b) the benchmark bond 10 year yields.
Source: (a) IMF (WEO), author's calculation, (b) Datastream
the main driver of employment creation. With a growing concern that its delayed recovery 1 discourages our growth expectation and job security, the slump in business investment has been at the core of policy debates on its roots and remedies and of the G20's efforts to promote an inclusive growth. Recently, a group of economists from the OECD (Lewis et al., 2014) , the BIS (Banerjee et al., 2015) , the IMF (2015), the Banque de France (Bussière et al., 2015) and the Bank of Canada (Leboeuf et al., 2016) Leboeuf et al. (2016) add some open economy features to the ongoing investment puzzle debate. They include domestic as well as trade partners' growth prospect in the uncertainty augmented accelerator model.
As its contribution, the study tests various proxies for a measure of uncertainty in the estimation model for five advanced economies over years 2003-2014. The empirical evidence underlines the role of foreign demand prospect on the part of firms' investment decision. They conclude that the sluggish private investment over recent years is mostly due to a gloomy outlook on the strength of global demand from the private sector.
The main policy recommendation from the literature is obvious: boosting aggregate demands, signaling positive economic prospects and reducing uncerincreasing outward investment. As for the latter, the paper explains that the G7 FDI net outflows have increased vis à vis domestic investment after the crisis and points that according to empirical studies, the relationship between aggregate FDI outflow and domestic investment is not clearly defined. My study, which focuses on advanced economies, abstains from the impact of FDI flows in the discussion.
tainty. But, when it comes to which specific policy tools policymakers could take to encourage business investment, we need to further investigate the deeper roots of origins for depressed business investment. The fall in business investment in advanced economies is not a recent phenomenon; rather, it follows a historical downward trend. This feature has an important implication for Korea whose investment record is stagnant but might embrace the trend observed in advanced economies in the long term 3 . In addition, investment itself is a primary component of aggregate demands. Therefore, it is worth trying to elaborate on the mechanism to shed light on the (in)direct effects of aggregate demands on investment. As its contribution to the recent literature, this study attempts to augment the uncertainty-finance accelerator investment model with new driving forces that connect the (future) aggregate demands and investment from a structural perspective.
The purpose of this study is to empirically explain the root origins of the investment puzzle or a persistently low private investment from the demand side. Building up an investment model for an empirical exercise, I assume that some structural changes have persistently affected the aggregate demands and had an adverse effect on private investment. 4 To examine main determinants that explain the impacts of aggregate demands on investment, this study approaches the investment puzzle from the global megatrend perspective (OECD (GSG), 2015) 5 for the first time in the literature: a shift from manufacturing to service oriented economy, population ageing and a rise in income inequality.
This also links to the recent secular stagnation hypothesis (Summers, 2014 , Eichengreen, 2015 and Thwaites, 2015 but I emphasize more the implication of an industrial shift to service economy to take into account sector-dependent firm dynamics effects on business investment.
The empirical model of the study identifies a shift toward service-oriented economy, demographic changes and income inequality as megatrend variables of having restrained private investment by aggregate demand channel. A shift toward service economy explains business investment via price and quantity channels. The price effect of the transition is measured by a firm unit investment value index which I calculate by dividing the total business investment by total number of firms in the manufacturing and service sectors. In my analysis, the firm unit investment value in the service sector is substantially lower than in manufacturing. Since the price effect of the industrial shift always dominates the quantity effects generated by more firm entries in the service sector, it reduces business investment during the transition to service. But this does not always mean that investment activity has been suppressed. My study points that the entry rate of firms in service is always higher than in manufacturing in the OECD countries.
It is just not high enough to trade off the price effects. In this line, the fall in business investment could send an unjustly pessimistic signal to the market. As Weil (1999) and Hock and Weil (2012) studied the role of rising old-age dependency in reductions in consumption, population ageing adds to the financial burden on the working population to support retirees via the channel of the (future) fiscal transfers to elderly people. This would decrease the disposable incomes of the working generation to consume, while the longer life expectancy intensifies savings motives in the working and old population together. 6 vironmental systems" (OECD (GSG), 2015). 6 Kwon (2016) showed the increasing life expectancy has driven the rise in Korea's savings rate (a fall in consumption) although its population has been already rapidly ageing. The average propensity to consume in Korea dropped from 78% in 2003 to 72% in 2015. According to the study, this is a common event in all age groups with a sharper fall in older groups.
These might drag down the average propensity to consume in economy. According to empirical evidences on decreasing marginal propensity to consume in income distribution (see Alichi et al., 2016 for the US; Carroll et al., 2014 and O'Farrell et al., 2016 for the European countries; and Jeon et al., 2009 for Korea), I also hypothesize that an increase in income inequality also plays a role in pulling down (expected) aggregate consumption, and thus business investment.
With most of academic discussions exclusively focusing on economic impacts of changes in the functional income distribution, there is little empirical research on the personal income distribution on aggregate consumption (see Stockhammer et al., 2016 for the discussion 7 ). However, Carvalho et al. (2016) theoretically prove that income inequality in wage earners affects negatively the aggregate demand in economy, observing increasing saving rates with income in Stockhammer et al. (2016) summarize diverse empirical literature that discusses the wage-led or profit-led demand regimes, the impact of inequality on aggregate demands and how these effects are different based on the definition of income such as functional income distribution or personal income distribution and whether or not the latter includes wealth and debt.
Ⅱ. Data 13 the US. Cho (2007) empirically showed the negative impact of income inequality on household consumption in Korea using the ratio of the 5 th quintile to the 1 st quintile households' income, based on the assumption that decreasing marginal propensity to consume in income suppresses aggregate consumption in a rise in income inequality. In Table 1 , the baseline correlation confirms the main assumptions on the relationship among investment, private consumptions and megatrend variables (see Table A .2. for data description).
As additional contribution specifically for the G20 discussion, the empirical model in the study estimates the potential spillover effects of megatrend variables across countries through trade channel. I assume that this would amplify their negative (positive) effects on investment when it happens simultaneously as global megatrends. The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the stylized facts of megatrends and the data for the empirical exercise. Section III presents the model and the estimators. In Section IV, I report the estimation results and discuss the policy implications of the outcomes and Section V concludes.
Ⅱ. Data
The empirical study uses the annual data set of 10 advanced economies over 1980-2014. The panel of countries are composed of the G7 economies, and Australia, Korea and Switzerland (see Table A .1.) . Concerning the sample collection, I focus on advanced economies that have seen historically a falling trend in business investment and the clear structural changes which the study identifies as megatrends. As the size of sample and the observation period are constrained by limited data availability for the variables of our interest, the panel dataset is unbalanced. The following section presents the stylized facts of megatrends observed in my dataset with data description.
14 Investment puzzle: Deeper roots
Investment
Investment in the analysis is gross net investment in fixed capital assets (gross fixed capital formation, GFCF) by the business sector. For business investment, I use the data of gross fixed capital formation in machinery, equipment and transportation from the OECD National Accounts Database given that this component of the fixed investment is mostly covered by the business sector. Investment and GDP data in current local currency are used to create the ratio of business investment to GDP for the empirical study. 64% respectively, while Japan (11%), the US (28%) and France (30%) see a relatively modest drop. As discussed in the former section, the investment performance in 2014, compared to the level in 2007, still has not recovered to the precrisis level, still showing a slightly on-going downward trend. As for the postcrisis comparison, Australia (32%), Italy (28%) and Canada (26%) have experienced a relatively big fall in investment, while the US (4%), Korea (5%) and Japan (6%) show a relatively moderate recession in investment.
(Global) Megatrends
The term "(global) megatrends" is unusual in economics discussions but re- elderly (aged 65 and over), while only six people supported one in 2014. 9 In light of ageing deepening 10 , Korea (5.7 per 1), the US (4.6 per 1) and Australia (4.5 per 1) are under relatively less saving pressures, while Japan (2.4 per 1), Italy (2.9 per 1) and Germany (3.7 per 1) bear a relatively heavier ageing burden. The old-age dependency ratio in the US, the UK and France has been elevated since 2006.
The average annual growth rate of ageing in the US and the UK in 2006-2014 is almost three times the average growth rate during the whole observation period.
Income inequality Income inequality in the study is measured as Gini coefficients. The study borrows the Gini indices of net and market from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt, 2016) . The
Gini net index here is based on equivalised disposable income after social transfers and taxes while the Gini market is calculated on the market income before the public redistribution treatment. By comparing the estimates of two indices in the empirical study, we could check the effect of fiscal policy or government intervention on business investment. To emphasize the sector-dependent business dynamic effects on investment via price and quantity channels, I initially planned to use the ratio of firm share in the service sector relative to the manufacturing sector's which explains the impact of a shift toward service on business investment. However, the panel data of sector-level enterprise number 12 is highly unbalanced and short. By using the full dataset of number of firms for the US 13 , I found an alternative proxy for a variable of industrial shift to service. After several correlation tests, the ratio of total employees in the sectors is almost identically correlated to the firm share ratio as in the Table 2 . The ratio of employees in service to manufacturing is used as a variable for the industrial shift in the empirical estimation.
The study draws the dataset of total employees in the sectors from the AME- 
Ⅲ. Empirical Model: Augmented Demand Accelerator Model
The empirical framework of the study builds on the accelerator model of investment as in Bussière et al. (2015) and Leboeuf et al. (2016 
All variables are transformed into log values. The dependent variable , is business investment. _ , and , represent a variable for gdp per capita growth and a vector of megatrend variables. The latter includes the explanatory variables for population ageing ( , ), income inequality (Gini net ( _ , ), Gini market ( _ , )), industrial shift to service sector ( , ). , is a measure of uncertainty. , is a set of finance condition measures of long-term rates, short-term rates and credit volumes. As for short-term and long-term rates, I use the annual data of the OECD indicator. The short-term rates ( ℎ _ , ) are based on three-month money market rates and the long- 
Regarding the open economy version of the baseline model, the study extends the equation (1) 
where each country exports worldwide and its major trade partners are nine countries in the study sample to make the estimation procedure simple, which is fair based on that the total volume of each country's export to the nine coun- 16 The M2 money data are collected from the CEIC and the nominal GDP from the IMF. 17 To create megatrend indices which are used to examine the spillover effects of structural changes in trade partners, we need complete datasets over the observation period since the trade or GDP share of each trade partner in our sample countries is not negligible. The omitted dataset would distort the estimation results. As for the ratio of employees in service to manufacturing, the index covers only a short period over 1991-2008. Using this short index, I measured the trade partners' industry shift effects on domestic investment but its negative effect with small scale is statistically insignificant. The main result table does not include this estimation. Concerning the Gini coefficients, some omitted data which are not seriously long and frequent in the sample are linearly extrapolated and the robustness of result could be tested in more extended country samples. estimator, based on Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . First, to remove the country fixed effect ( ), the study transforms the equation (1) into the equation (4) by first differencing. 19
As we will read in the estimation results later, the estimated value for the 18 Nevertheless, I consider that it would be worth to use the trade-weight average in the regression, adding more trade partners, which would verify the effects of diversifying demand risks from the structural changes of old trade partners by trading with new trade partners. This work is one line of research to be pursued in the next step. 19 In the regression model, I do not consider time fixed effects as in other empirical literatures (Banerjee et al., 2016 and Mileva, 2008) in that it increases the number of instruments, which resulted in lower power of Sargan/Hansen test statistics. In addition, since the variables for political uncertainty and stock market uncertainty respond to common global shocks, including fixed effects reduces the explanatory power of these variables.
lagged dependent variable is substantially high, which implies strongly persistent effects of the past investment on current business investment. It could make the lagged values of the dependent variable weaker instruments in the differenced equations (Blundell and Bond, 1998) . To improve the efficiency of the estimator, I add the lagged differences of , as instruments for equations in levels as in the Arellano-Bond system GMM estimator. The endogenous variables in the estimator are those for investment, industrial shift to service economy, long-term rates and credit volumes, which is empirically acceptable since the selection improves the Arellano-Bond first-and second-order correlation test statistics and the Sargan test results of over-identifying restrictions. (1)), using policy uncertainty and stock market volatility for a variable of uncertainty (column (2)) improves the model specification given the selection of instruments for the moment conditions. The p-value of the Sargan test for the first column is not unacceptable but low as much as 0.082.
Ⅳ. Results and Policy Implication 1. Closed Economy

Megatrends
The first two columns set out the estimation results of the closed economy framework. As we expected, the estimation evidence supports that the megatrend variables that I assume affect (future) aggregate demands play a substantial role to explain business investment behavior (see column (2)). A 10%p rise 
The estimation methodology is one-step system GMM with small sample robust correction. Standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1-percent levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the ratio of nominal business investment to GDP.
in the number of firms (employees) in the service sector relative to manufacturing reduces the investment-GDP ratio by 0.74%p and a 10%p increase in people aged older than 64 per 100 working age population (old-age dependency ratio) decreases business investment by 0.68%p. As for the income inequality, investment drops by 0.38%p to a 10%p increase in Gini-net indicator, which is not statistically significant. But when I use the Gini-market indicator that does not consider the public redistribution, the result becomes significant and the magnitude of elasticity is slightly increased. A 10%p up in Gini-market cuts investment by 0.39%p. The role of the lagged investment is highly persistent.
This implies that a shock to variables in the equation could have long-run effects on investment in steady state. That is why the relatively small size of estimated coefficients could not moderate the importance of the outcomes.
The result underlines that the demand side approach is important to boost investment
given that such megatrends as a shift toward service economy, ageing population and increasing inequality have subdued the aggregate demands in long term. It strongly supports the role of inclusiveness in investment policy. As for the transition to the service economy which accounts for investment demand directly, however, the negative coefficient of the variable could mask positive firm dynamics and employment effects in the service sector.
Composition of the Sectoral Shift: the Role of Sector-Dependent Firm Dynamics Price effects I argue that the shift-to-service driven investment fall is the price-dominant effect during the transition. One of the main contributions of this study is to attempt to quantify the price effects of sector-dependent firm dynamics on investment. Borrowing the idea of export (import) unit value index developed in trade, I generate a firm unit investment value index by dividing the total business investment in current local currency by total number of firms in the manufacturing and service sectors. As a benchmark, the study compares these indices for the US and Korea. As in Figure 6 , the firm unit investment 28 Investment puzzle: Deeper roots value in the service sector is substantially lower than in manufacturing. In the US (2013), the unit value in the service sector takes only 20% of the value in manufacturing, while this ratio is much lower, 11% in Korea (2013) . This price channel could reduce business investment during the transition, but it could also make the economy unjustly believe that business dynamics has been suppressed. That is the reason we need to look at the firm dynamics across sectors. while most of subsectors' firm unit investment value is much lower than manufacturing's except for information. The price-dominant effect over quantity is observed during the industrial shift to the service economy. The empirical part of the study confirmed this effect with the estimation result as in Table 3 that an increasing firm (employee) share in the service sector relative to the manufacturing decreases business investment. Korea is a very contrasting case. Compared to the US, the industrial shift toward the service economy has not pro- Second, the empirical evidence shows that population ageing and inequality reduce investment. This implies that government fiscal policy could be closely linked to investment policy. This study suggests that, to stimulate the inclusivedemand-investment cycle but to control the public debt in manageable criteria at the same time, government fiscal policies could exploit the relatively high propensity to consume in economic groups. For instance, social transfers to youth and low income households would maximize the effects of public spending in the short-term and during recession periods, while developing business opportunities targeted to the needs of elderly population is a necessary and positive option to cope with the long period of ageing.
Uncertainty and Financing Condition
Similar to the former empirical literatures, financing conditions play a minor role. The relationship between (short-term) financing conditions and invest- 
Open Economy
Trade Partners' Ageing
The columns (3)- (5) Gini-market cuts investment by 0.39%p. In addition, the empirical study presents the significant negative spillover effects of trade partners' ageing and income inequality. A 10%p increase in trade partners' ageing (trade partners' income inequality based on Gini-net) decreases a country's own business investment by 0.83%p (0.35%p). However, I admit that the latter results need to be checked in more elaborate empirical strategies and data for the future research.
The main empirical results strongly support the role of inclusiveness for the investment policy. I argue that a rise in firm entry in service will encourage business investment via an increase in firms' investment demand and by the Ⅴ. Conclusion 35 channel of increasing the aggregate consumption through quality job creation in the service sector, which would reduce inequality through increasing labor force participation. As for Korea, the service sector is a main linkage to make the inclusive-demand-investment cycle work. The challenge facing Korea is to reshape the overall firm distribution in the service sector toward high quality job creation sectors. Removing entry barriers, enhancing a new firm-friendly business environment and more competition and providing high skills training & education would be a priority for generating quality jobs in service sector.
Concerning the negative spillover effects of trade partners' ageing and given how ageing is a global megatrend among advanced economies, reciprocal protectionism among the pool of aged countries would be ineffective. Enhancing trade and development cooperation with developing economies would diversify the foreign and domestic demand risks from ageing. A rise in trade partners'
income inequality (in a country's own) could discourage business investment at home. This empirical result sends a strong message to the G20 countries. As agreed at the G20 Hangzhou Summit 2016 23 and the recent G20 finance ministers meeting 2017 in Baden-Baden and Washington D.C. 24 , developing proper indicators that assess the G20's efforts in inclusiveness with structural reforms and further improving them are expected to stimulate global business investment. 23 Annexed to G20 Leaders' communique Hangzhou Summit which announced that "Inclusiveness. We will work to ensure that our economic growth serves the needs of everyone,,, generating more quality jobs, addressing inequalities and eradicating poverty,,,"(www.g20chn.org), the G20 Enhanced Structural Reform Agenda, prepared by the G20 Framework Working Group, identified nine areas as structural reform priorities including "promoting inclusive growth". It suggested guiding principles for each priority and indicators as quantitative framework to evaluate and monitor the progress of structural reform efforts at the G20 level. As for the inclusive growth area, the Agenda proposed Shared Prosperity Premium from the World Bank or Gini coefficient from the OECD (www.g20.utoronto.ca). 24 Besides "economic resilience", the G20 finance ministers meetings under the German Presidency underlined "inclusiveness" in the communiques (www.g20.utoronto.ca). The international organizations such as the IMF and the OECD will deliver policy analysis reports to achieve the goal of inclusive growth as preparation for the Leaders' Summit in July 2017 (Press release (April 22, 2017) , the Ministry of Strategy and Finance of Korea). 
